If the draft law is prepared for entry into the State Duma, it complies with the requirements of Article 104 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Duma, the Council of the State Duma for the Offer of the Profile Committee shall take the following decision: Federal laws adopted by the State Duma within five days shall be submitted to the Council of the Federation. The federal law shall be considered an approved Council of the Federation if it has elected more than half of the total number of members of this House or if it has not been considered by the Council of the Federation within fourteen days. In case of derogation from the federal law, the Federation Council of the House may establish a conciliation commission to overcome differences of opinion that have arisen, and then the federal law is subject to repeated review by the State Duma. In short, Russia is unlikely to become a constitutional or constitutional state after Putin. Whether Putin plans to die in power, lose power in a color revolution, or be replaced after the collapse of his authoritarian coalition, the prospects for a transition to constitutionalism and an independent judiciary are slim. Internal and external pressure on the Putin regime to abandon instrumental law enforcement is low. Ironically, the potential agents of change are Putin himself and members of his authoritarian coalition, not civil society. A gradual transition to authoritarian constitutionalism is theoretically possible if Putin and his close associates plan to leave politics and need guarantees that future political office holders will not use the law and docile justice to prosecute them. Alternatively, a group of large corporate owners could lobby for the rule of law to protect their assets. In practice, however, Putin`s demonstrated preference for informal negotiations rather than formal institutions as tools for coordination makes the former scenario unlikely. And the transformation of the robber barons for the rule of law was expected over the past two decades; but we have yet to see any indication that this will happen.31 Federal laws are passed by majority vote on the total number of deputies in the State Duma. Russia`s authoritarianism does not fully explain its weak constitutionalism, because constitutionalism is not always incompatible with autocracy.
Autocrats can govern within a constitutional framework, even if they are not completely compelled to do so. In an authoritarian regime of the ideal type, the autocrat establishes substantive law, often in negotiations with his ruling coalition. The opposition has no means of shaping substantive law, either through the legislative process or by appealing to the Constitutional Court. Many fundamental rights are not granted. Substantive law is biased against the opposition and imposes sanctions on it. For example, it may limit its ability to challenge elections or its right to criticize the government.2 However, once the law is in force, it will be applied in a predictable and non-arbitrary manner to individual cases of functionally independent courts.3 Members of the opposition shall be punished in accordance with laws restricting opposition activities. rather than being jailed on other charges. The courts are sufficiently removed from direct political influence, and the constitution serves as an institution of coordination between the autocrat and the elites with whom he governs. If the autocrat and his ruling coalition reach power-sharing agreements and enshrine these agreements in the constitution or general legislation, there is sufficient expectation that the obligations will be respected and enforced by the judiciary in good faith.  Western companies hoping to one day return to the Russian market received more bad news with a series of new laws. which further infringe the rights of companies and individuals in Russia.
The State Duma`s latest actions follow Western sanctions and growing domestic repression that are clouding the country`s political and economic prospects. The insider notes: “At the end of the spring session, the State Duma deputies passed a legislative package that you can be imprisoned for almost anything.” “I weakly support the impact of Putin`s last eight years on the rule of law in Russia,” Jeffrey D. Kahn, assistant professor of law at Southern Methodist University, said at a seminar at the Kennan Institute on April 17, 2008. According to Kahn, there are many good laws in Russia, and Putin deserves credit for implementing important reforms and meeting international legal obligations. “But there is not enough law with a capital L in Russia. For the most part, there is no legal culture. In areas of law of minor political importance, either because they are politically insignificant or because there is a broad political consensus on how these cases should be decided, the Russian judiciary functions quite well. Freed from direct outside interference or the burden of guessing the preferences of politically powerful actors, judges decide cases in accordance with their good-faith interpretation of the law. Companies that use arbitration tribunals to resolve disputes report that they expect acceptable court decisions if vlast` is not involved.11 Ordinary citizens who have experience going to court report that the decision in their case was fair and that the judge was professional, even in the context of reported lack of trust in the Russian judicial system as a whole.12 In the early 2000s When United Russia organized the elections Sovereignly won, and the regime had not yet taken steps to suppress political dissent, the courts ruled on voter registration without overwhelming bias against pro-government candidates.13 In the late 2000s, Russians filed more than half a million administrative lawsuits against the state, demanding compensation for poor decisions by federal agencies. and winning most of them.